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THE LIMITS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU’S ASIAN INTERNATIONALISM
AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1949 – 1959

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1 - 7

CHAPTER 1 – Panchsheel ........................................................ 8 - 36


CONCLUSION .................................................................... 54 - 55

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................56 - 62

APPENDIX I – Sino-Indian Border Disputes .........................63
Introduction

"Asia fascinates me, the long past of Asia, the achievements of Asia through millennia of history, the troubled present of Asia and the future that is taking shape almost before our eyes."¹

- Jawaharlal Nehru

Long before Jawaharlal Nehru became India’s first prime minister, he held a long fascination with Asian unity in which China and India would play a central role. As Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964, Nehru formulated a new direction for India’s international relations, which focused on Asia as a region for peace, anti-imperialism and independence from the superpower blocs. Persuaded by Asian brotherhood among the decolonized and those on the verge of decolonization, Nehru believed that with the rapid dissolution of the European empires at the conclusion of the Second World War, Asia’s past historical links could now be reclaimed. Accordingly, the Sino–Indian relations were closely woven into Nehru’s idea of the emergence of Asia, and of India’s pivotal role in the new Asian cooperation. Thus, Nehru sought China’s good relations, nationalist or communist, and forged a foreign policy in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a prominent partner. From 1949 through 1955, Nehru strengthened and expanded Sino-Indian relations by mutual support in critical areas of national, regional and international importance. Despite these efforts and much to Nehru’s regret, China and India fought a month-long but intense border war in 1962. This turn of events not

only severed Sino-Indian relations, but it also ended Nehru’s commitment to the Asian internationalism that he nurtured for so long.

From India’s pre-independence to 1955, Nehru’s foreign policy of Asian internationalism was deeply tested by the prerogatives of the nation-states. Inherent in Nehru’s worldview was a construction of Asian federation with a free India and a free China taking the lead. Two internationalist moments emerged: the Panchsheel Treaty of 1954 and the Bandung Conference of 1955. Both left enduring legacies that still reverberate today; but paradoxically, these seminal events sowed the seeds from which Nehru’s Nonaligned Movement (NAM) would arise. Far from the principle of Asian fraternalism and cooperation, Nehru formed nonalignment as a national and political demand in the age of nationalism. As a politician in power, Nehru ended up walking away from his cherished vision of Asian solidarity and friendship with China, succumbing to the nationalist currents of state building and the geopolitical trap of the Cold War. The outcome of which was the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 which diminished Nehru’s secured standing in the world’s opinion and cut a deep wound in the collective spirit of the Indian people. The war inflicted humiliation and bitterness that it was attributed to Nehru’s death two years after of a broken heart.  

How did this dramatic reversal and complete rupture between India and China occur in such a relatively short period? There is a consensus among historians that Tibet was the cause of the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations that pointed to the year of 1959 when the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa to India to seek asylum. In most cases,  

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historians focus on the flawed leadership of either China’s Mao Zedong or Nehru in the context of the Tibetan question, and the handling of the Himalayan disputed borders and territories. In these instances, historians either depict China as the aggressor and Nehru as the idealist betrayed by Mao.\(^3\) Or in the opposite spectrum, Nehru was blamed for his shortcomings as a leader and his naivety in thinking China shared a mutual interest in Asian unity and Sino-Indian friendship.\(^4\) Other schools of thought have situated tensions between India and China as a postcolonial legacy in which imperial intrigues and the British Raj’s manipulation of Himalayan frontiers and territories left a troubled inheritance that led to conflict.\(^5\) In some accounts, scholars emphasize regional power rivalry between India and China over their leadership in Asia.\(^6\) This last argument seeks to explain how the push for regional influence over Asian neighbors informed the construction of competitive nationalism in India and China that ultimately led to war.\(^7\)

Still, a final school of thought has underscored the role of the Cold War context and geopolitics as a key reason for the Sino-Indian split.\(^8\) In all of these schools, the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations began with the Dalai Lama fleeing Tibet in 1959.


\(^4\) Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Cape, 1970).


\(^7\) Nehru’s claims on Himalayan territories underpinned aspect of nationalism, see Steven Hoffman, India’s War with China (University California Press, 1990). Nehru on relations with the Chinese as both in the realm of nationalism and political realism, see Giri Deshingkar, ‘The Nehru Years Revisited', in Tan Chung, ed. Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998); John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 20th Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004).

Unlike these conventional arguments about Sino-Indian relations, this paper locates the roots of conflict much earlier and in an unlikely place, the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty of 1954. Panchsheel was a trade pact signed between China and India and the first legal document that enunciated the famous Five Principles of Co-Existence. In it, China and India promised to maintain friendly relations by adhering to mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. In the Panchsheel Treaty, India conceded to China its military, communication, postal and other rights inside Tibet, but the treaty did not address or specify the Himalayan frontiers and shared borders immediately contiguous to Tibet. In the case of Panchsheel, this thesis traces the ambiguities bequeathed by the imperial legacy in territorial rights and sovereign claims; and how Nehru and Mao attempted to resolve them with the Panchsheel Treaty, which articulated the need for friendship but failed to resolve their border issues.

The second event that pushed for the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations was the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, following on the heels of the signing of the treaty of Panchsheel in 1954. Twenty-nine recently decolonized states or semi-decolonized states came together to address Asian problems and solutions. To this day, it is still honored as the historic moment when the “people of color” and of the “people of the oppressed” stood up for themselves to resist the

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9 See India, Panchsheel (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1957).
10 Twenty-three Asian states attended: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North and South Vietnam and Yemen. There were six African nations: Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan.
continuing cabal of Western imperialism. Conceived by the Five Colombo Powers, Bandung represented an exclusively race-based gathering of developing countries as a resistance to Cold War politics. It was supposedly a unified assembly on the sole basis of shared historical experience in colonialism and racism among the newly independent states. But for the first time, Asian leaders came together not as activists and revolutionaries of anti-colonial movements, but as politicians in power. Thus, Bandung would expose the differences among the delegates as they were essentially divided into two columns, those who opposed Western imperialism and those who were anti-communism.

While Panchsheel and Bandung are acclaimed in the minds of the formerly colonized peoples in Asia and Africa, far from being the unifying instruments, this thesis argues that internationalist moment forcibly hastened the deterioration of relations between India and China and the demise of Nehru's vision of Pan-Asian solidarity. Panchsheel exposed divisions between India and China while Bandung revealed the underlying tensions among the Asian delegates that spelled out the end of a long-time foreign policy endeavor of Nehru’s internationalism, the crux of which was a closer partnership with China. The implications of Bandung and the Panchsheel Treaty on Sino-

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11 Reporting on the significance of Bandung from one of the perspectives of the ‘oppressed,’ Richard Wright, American writer, activist, poet was the voice for an entire generation of black Americans. His works won critical praises for portraying racism and violence in American South. Among the foreign correspondents covering the conference, Richard Wright was probably the only black American. His first-hand personal account in Bandung, chronicled in *The Color Curtain* is widely referenced and quoted in numerous writings analyzing the conference. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain, A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956). (Hereafter cited as *Color Curtain*).

12 The original impetus for the Bandung Conference emerged with the Colombo Five, regional powers in Asia: India’s Nehru, Indonesia’s Sukarno, Burma’s U Nu, Ceylon’s Kotelawala (Neutrals), and Pakistan’s Ali (Western-allied).
Indian relations would make themselves felt in 1959 when the first shot was fired in the Himalayan frontier that signaled the sundering of their relations. But the seeds of the conflict were sown earlier as this thesis demonstrates.

This paper is organized into two main chapters prefaced by the introduction and followed by a conclusion and bibliography. The first chapter expands on the Panchsheel Treaty of 1954, which enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful-Co-existence. India became Panchsheel’s most impassioned proponent as it was compatible with Nehru’s neutrality and pacifist approach to international relations. It argues that the premise of Panchsheel was that nation-states in Asia had to respect each others’ state borders and the national sovereignty of neighbors. This approach was inherently flawed in that it was designed as a tool to secure cooperation and peace, but by emphasizing national borders and territories as the primary determinant of sovereignty, the treaty, even as it sought to encourage peace, paradoxically, heightened the tensions between India and China over their unsettled borders. Thus, the treaty reinforced a stronger position on territorial possessions and fixed boundaries that reduced the possibilities of Nehru’s hopes for internationalist solidarities and friendship between India and China. Ultimately, the primacy of state imperatives to push for national interests above all became more pronounced in the treaty, and this created a crisis in Nehru’s internationalist vision of Asia.

The second chapter centers on the Bandung Conference of 1955. Although it was heralded as the zenith of Asian relations and the peak of Nehru’s foreign policy achievement, two issues are worth noting in Bandung. While it invoked the spirit of Asian solidarity in the periphery, the participating Asian countries were not harmonious.
Second, the discordant atmosphere in Bandung and the divisions between the Western-allied and neutral nation-states would foreshadow a new shift in Nehru’s foreign policy. He would eventually abandon his Asian internationalism and with it would follow the demise of his close association and friendship with the Chinese.

In resituating the history of tensions between India and China in these critical events in the early 1950s, this thesis makes several important contributions. It debunks the myths of Asian cooperation in Panchsheel and Bandung by exposing the national pressures undermining such efforts to construct peace and solidarity in Cold War Asia. This thesis challenges the conventions that these moments were the hallmarks of bilateral relations between India and China. As head of a nation-state, Nehru’s expressions of internationalism and Asian solidarity could not be sustained when domestic political forces of nation building predominantly occupied the priorities of his national agenda. By exposing the ways Indian internationalist ideas were incompatible with the political reality in Cold War Asia, this thesis reveals the repercussions of the two moments in China and India relations that seemed to promote peace but actually created greater tensions between them. In Panchsheel, the Five Principles highlight the incompatibility of seeking peace against an unsettled and contested national boundary. In Bandung, the event marks the closure of Nehru’s Asian solidarity and with it, as a consequence, the end of the close partnership with China.
Chapter One

Panchsheel

*If Panchsheel is fully and sincerely accepted by all countries, peace would be assured everywhere, and cooperation would follow.*

- Jawaharlal Nehru

It was 1954, the apogee of the Sino-Indian relations when Beijing and New Delhi signed the Panchsheel Treaty or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Earlier that year, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Delhi where locals chanted in the streets in India, “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” the Chinese and Indians are brothers, a popular slogan illustrating the touchstone of their friendship. Late that year, Nehru made a reciprocal visit to Beijing, his first, and received a warm and unprecedented welcome of which “millions” of Chinese greeters lined the streets, an overwhelming evidence of the people’s “basic urges for friendship with India.” More than ever, Nehru was convinced that the immemorial friendship between India and China was headed in the right direction.

The premise of the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954, as it was called then and later adapted as the Panchsheel Treaty, was to put in place a set of interstate benchmarks of cooperation and friendship among nations, ones that would be a model for the rest of the

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13 Jawaharlal Nehru, from a speech at the civic reception for Mr. Bulgarin and Mr. Khruschev in Calcutta, November 30, 1955. See *India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches*, September 1946–April 1961 (Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, New Delhi 1961), 101. (Hereafter cited as *India’s Foreign Policy*).

global community to emulate. A central dimension of Nehru's Asian internationalism, the treaty's preamble enshrined the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.  

Yet, the Panchsheel Treaty, in which India relinquished its extraterritorial rights over Tibet, failed to accomplish what was of paramount importance for India's and China's sense of national territorial integrity and sovereignty. The treaty neglected to address the physical and geographic delineation of their shared 2,500 miles of contiguous borders from the west to the east end of the Indo-Tibetan borders. Although the intention of Panchsheel with its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was to promote principled and peaceful behavior in international foreign relations, the treaty presented a double-edged sword for two Asian countries with poorly delineated borders. By emphasizing territorial integrity and sovereignty as the fundamental basis for peaceful co-existence, the treaty opened up a new and highly volatile point of contention between states with ambiguously defined and contested borders. The premise of all Five Principles depended on mutual recognition and respect of their shared border, and ironically this was one of the gravest contentions between them. Thus, deeply embedded and fundamental to a treaty specifically designed to ensure peace and friendship were the one point of contention destined to drive a wedge between the two emerging regional powers in Asia.

At first, what started as a low profile treaty in 1954 became a watermark in international cooperation. Beijing and Delhi worked together to push for the acceptance of Panchsheel, so that, “every nation would abide by its norms.” The joint statements from the two Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, at the adoption of Panchsheel, declared:

“If these principles are applied, not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence.....The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other countries of Asia.”

The Third World countries were the first to endorse the Five Principles of Co-Existence, which were also embraced later by the socialist blocs of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. A year later, the United States also accepted Panchsheel in “words and deeds.” Britain declared Panchsheel as the basis of the Commonwealth. The rapid acceptance of Panchsheel internationally was the realization of the Asian solidarity that Nehru had hoped to see come to fruition. Years later, India played a considerable part

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16 Ironically, Nehru’s Panchsheel came from a low-profile treaty in 1954 and was signed by second-tier ambassadorial consuls in India and China. Even the original name signifies its minor status: The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. The treaty detailed specifics pilgrim routes and trading posts in Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung inside Tibet where Indian military escorts and police were stationed. Renewal in eight years, the treaty outlined the settlement of pending problems through goodwill and cooperation. An exchange of notes followed to deal with the transfer of the post, telegraph and telephone services, and rest houses from the Government of India to the People’s Republic of China.


18 India, Panchsheel, Appendix. Also see India, Leading Events, 4.
19 India, Panchsheel, 11.
20 Ibid, 8.
21 Ibid, 9.
together with other countries, such as Yugoslavia and Sweden, to pass a resolution unanimously in the adoption of the Five Principles at the United Nations on December 11, 1957. 22 It would be hailed as one of the major foreign policy achievements for India.

Looming large in Panchsheel was the contradiction between international cooperation and national imperatives. Nehru’s inclination to support Asian fraternity came into direct conflict with the national prerequisites of security and boundary setting designed to uphold India’s vital national interests. In the age of crumbling empires and rapid decolonization, fundamental to a new nation-state such as India and China were the international recognition of the legitimacy of its nationhood, a cohesive national identity based on territoriality. 23 The international and practical normative formation of nationhood was tied to a geographical territory, a fixed and immovable boundary. For Nehru’s India, the sovereignty of the Indian nation was closely linked to the integrity of its territory, starting from the north of its mighty Himalayan frontiers to the south of its maritime tip point. With the trauma of the subcontinent’s vivisection during Partition in 1947, Nehru’s outmost national exigency was maintaining the status quo in retaining all imperial territorial inheritance; expanding cartographic domains by wresting control over Pondicherry and Goa from the French and Portuguese respectively; and delegitimizing

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22 On UN resolution on co-existence, see speech in Lok Sabha, December 17, 1957, India’s Foreign Policy, 102-104.
23 The ideal of a strong nation-state was inspired by Wilson’s Fourteen-Point declaration, which called for a nation’s self-determination after the break up of the European empires. The idea of a nation state was centered on one people and one nation. As decolonization occurred, subject peoples and nations aimed to gain the nation-state status for international recognition. Therefore, territorial sovereignty and boundary setting became the norm in forging nation-state personhood. See Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 46-72.
claims counter to India’s own interests in disputed territories with Pakistan and China’s administered Tibet.

Mao, not unlike Nehru, had the same national imperatives: reclaiming China’s rightful place in the region, dismantling the unequal treaties of the imperial past and recovering those territories lost during the last century, one China characterized as the national humiliation in the hands of foreign imperialists. And because the revolutionary government squarely viewed itself as the legitimate inheritor and government of the Chinese republic, not the Guomindang of Jiang Jieshi in Taiwan, the urgency of recovering these territories was foremost in the PRC’s national agenda. Furthermore, it had fought bloodier wars, and the People’s Republic was not adversely against using force in a conflict. Thus, the unsettled Himalayan territory was simmering to a boiling point in which a full-blown conflict was on the horizon.

The irony of the Panchsheel Treaty was that, according to the document, territorial boundaries defined the terms of peace between two nation-states. This presented a unique problem for China and India, states with conflicting perceptions of their borderlands and territorial sovereignty. In particular, the areas contiguous to Tibet were in question. Instead of unifying the two neighbors in peace, as Nehru hoped, the paradox of Panchsheel was that it became the trigger that forced India and China to confront one another on the boundaries that served as the basis of their peace treaty. This contradiction forced the two Asian states into confrontation much sooner and more

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24 Communist Chinese international relations were informed by the national identity Mao heavily identified with, the victimhood identity through a century of humiliation. The national goals: ending remnants of imperialism and colonialism, restoring Chinese territorial sovereignty and integrity, and continuing the momentum of socialist revolution in the domestic arena and abroad. See Nianlong Han, Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990); John Garver, The Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Prentice–Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1993); Based on new documentary evidence made available by the Chinese government in 1990s, see Jian Chen, Mao and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
forcefully by underscoring the prerequisite of mutually agreed upon boundaries. In the end, the Asian solidarity that marked the inauguration of Panchsheel was supplanted and undermined by the overwhelming national imperatives confronting Nehru and Mao in a treaty destined to bring them into conflict over the borders they both claimed sovereignty over.

I. Nehru’s Asianism and Internationalism Before and During Panchsheel

The idea of Asian unity captivated Jawaharlal Nehru long before the Indian republic’s independence. For Nehru, the Asian map was a broad canvas of shared cultural heritage and established historical links through the spread of Buddhism and centuries of cross-border and interstates commerce. Born from his early experiences in nationalist and international movements, Nehru mapped out, as a priority, the restoration of the historical and cross-cultural ties among Asian peoples. As an inherent Indian sensibility, his internationalism reflected a distinctive Asian “inflection” invoking Asian thoughts and themes. Nehru’s transformative experience outside of the subcontinent in the late 1920s, crystallized for him the immediacy of associating with other colonized countries to form a collective movement in their struggle for liberation. Nehru’s preoccupation with Asian solidarity had its roots in his travels abroad, including his times with the League Against Imperialism (LAI) in Brussels. In fact, the league imbued his


26 Carolien Stolte, “Orienting India: Interwar Internationalism in an Asian Inflection, 1917-1937” (PhD. Diss., University of Leiden, 2013), 5. The author asserts that Indian internationalism was an “invocation of ‘Asia’ by Indian men and women from every possible religious and political affiliation.” Hence, Nehru embodied this characterization. Stolte, 5.
worldview with a well-blended mixture of national anti-colonialism and international anti-imperialism. The meeting at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels in 1927 gave Nehru two salient aims: the call for cooperation and solidarity between India and China, then the Nationalist government, and the imperative to "contest empires" by connecting with other anti-imperialists and national movements worldwide.

Furthermore, the encounters he made with revolutionaries, exiles, labor activists, and trade unionists, thinkers and academics would form a durable connection. Thirty years later, the contacts he made in this period would meet again and resurrect the Brussels spirit in Bandung.

So it was consistent for Nehru to advocate solidarity among his Asian counterparts against Western imperialism even after assuming the leadership of the largest democracy in the region. He led the international resistance against the Dutch on Indonesia's behalf in 1947, facilitated the Korean armistice between China and the United States in 1952, and upheld the rights of the PRC and smaller nations to be represented in the United Nations. These were interventions compatible to his internationalist sentiments with "Indian inflection."

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28 Michele Louro, "At Home in the World: Jawaharlal Nehru and Global Anti-Imperialism" (PhD. Diss., Temple University, 2011), 41-65.

29 In the opening speech by President Soekarno at the opening of the Asian – African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, he fondly said, "I recall in this connection the conference of the 'League Against Imperialism and Colonialism' which was held in Brussels almost 30 years ago. At that Conference many distinguished delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence." See George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), Appendix.
The affinity between China and India in Nehru’s mind had roots in ancient linkages of 2000 years of friendship and cross-border exchanges that spread Buddhism in China. The Nobel laureate and the great Bengali poet, Rabindranath Tagore, whom Nehru greatly admired and who exulted in Chinese culture and history, often celebrated this civilizational connection. An avid Asian devotee, Tagore promoted the spiritualism of Asian identity and chastised the “shameless humanity” and “the barbaric greed” of the Europeans. Chinese scholarship in India flourished in Tagore’s international university in Santiniketan, where the Cheena Bhavana (Institute of Chinese Language and Culture) was founded in 1937. Nehru’s own and only daughter, Indira was sent to study in Santiniketan. Tagore’s idea of a cultural and historical bridge between the two nations was celebrated in Nehru’s book, the Discovery of India, written just five years after Tagore’s death in 1941.

Another significant journey for Nehru was his travel to the Soviet Union in 1927 during the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution. Impressed by his visit, Nehru serialized his experiences in several articles. Published as a book called Soviet Russia in 1929, it promoted socialist ideas and reported on the progress of the Soviets. In Discovery of India, Nehru wrote, “I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human

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30 Tagore first exposure to “One Asia” theme was with the Japanese Okakura, the pan-Asianist at the turn of the 20th century, which started the cultural bridge between Asia and South Asia. However, Japan’s imperialist ambitions disqualified it from the spiritualism which defined Tagore’s and most Asianists’ idea of the Asian character. Tagore’s and Nehru’s Japan connection was completely severed in 1937 at the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War. See Carolien Stolte, “Orienting India: Interwar Internationalism in an Asian Inflection, 1917-1937” (PhD. Diss., University of Leiden, 2013), 75 - 90.

society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which would not be smothered.” As opposed to the exploitative nature of capitalism, Nehru was quite impressed with what he perceived as the egalitarian quality of the socialism he witnessed there. Quite a changed man was Nehru coming back home from the Soviet Union, he wrote in his autobiography, “My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed to me a definitely narrow and insufficient creed.” He continued, “Without social freedom and a socialistic structure of society and the state, neither the country nor the individual could develop much.” These sentiments would predispose Nehru to sympathize with socialist states such as Soviet Russia and China and to consider socialism as an economic model in modernizing India.

At the time of Indian independence, Nehru emphasized that the time was right for the restoration of “Asian eminence on the world stage” and India was ready to take part in that leadership role. Predictively, five months before independence, Nehru held the first Asian Relations Conference (ARC) in New Delhi in April 1947. In the inaugural address, Nehru declared the “Asian awakening in a new era of fellowship that championed peace, freedom and progress.” The idea of an Asian Federation as a resistance among the colonized people attained considerable traction in Nehru and the National Congress Party’s leadership. Once India assumed its independence later in August 1947, Nehru put in place an independent foreign policy centered on internationalism. From pre-independence to 1955, Nehru was preoccupied with assisting

32 Jawarhalal Nehru, Discovery of India, 15.
34 Jawaharlal Nehru, Address to Army officers, October 19, 1946, SWIN, Vol. 2, 311.
in the anti-colonial struggles of the newly independent Asian countries. Foremost in his agenda was ending foreign domination in Asia and forging international peace and cooperation. 36

In this reimagining of Asia, Nehru saw an ally, an equal in greatness, and of historical importance in China, whom he described as “that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbor, has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow.” 37 Nehru heralded the “two freedom-loving nations,” India’s and China’s civilizational eminence in antiquity and exulted these bonds as “far deeper and more abiding than political bonds” could ever be. 38 China’s central role and partnership with India, as validated by the centuries-old kinship of shared history and recent independent struggles were the foundation of Nehru’s Asian vision. Nehru saw their mutual goal of ending imperialism and colonialism paired with the freedom struggle for other decolonized nations in Asia as the path to Asian independence. The reunification of China in 1949, Nehru surmised, was “the most important fact in Asia and the world today.” 39 “Some are afraid of it,” he explained, “some welcome it, but whether we like it or not, it is an event of the highest importance in the present and in the future.” 40 So resisting US efforts to contain China would be a pillar of Nehru’s foreign policy and “a

36 Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, 416.
37 Jawaharlal Nehru, speech made on first broadcast over all India Radio as Vice President of the interim government, September 7, 1946. India’s Foreign Policy, 3; SWJN, Vol. 2, 407.
40 Ibid., 109.
key component of his effort as an Asian leader.”\footnote{Mohammad Yunus, \textit{Reflections on China: An Ambassador’s View from Beijing} (Lahore, Pakistan: Wajidalis, 1986), 102.} Notwithstanding, he saw the communists’ victory strictly through the lens of a national liberation struggle, in line with India’s anti-colonial and anti-imperial internationalism. Nehru confirmed this belief: “I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two countries of Asia, India, and China, should have friendly and as far as possible cooperative relations.”\footnote{India, Ministry of External Affairs, \textit{Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations: In Parliament} (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1961), Vol. 1, 115. See also, \textit{India’s Foreign Policy}, 344.} Within this framework, China, and Asian solidarity became the cornerstone of post-independent India’s foreign policy.

Nehru’s international activism was to galvanize Asians to come together through international conferences and to lend his voice to their concerns and priorities for self-determination. An inspiring demonstration of this was Nehru’s initiatives in organizing the Asian Relations Conference in April 1947, months before the transfer of power and the Second New Delhi Conference in January 1949 to provide concrete support to the Indonesian government against the Dutch by pressuring the UN Security Council to end hostilities there. By early 1950, Nehru was hard at work to befriend the Chinese and was representing their interests in many critical areas while the Chinese were embroiled in the struggle against US containment and encirclement.\footnote{India was among the first countries to recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China in 1950; Ambassador to Peking, K.M. Panikkar of India, became Premier Zhou Enlai’s intermediary and served as back channel envoy in communicating with the US and its allies that China intended to go to war if the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea; India opposed efforts to condemn the PRC for “aggression” in Korea; India proposed guidelines for Korean War armistice; India lobbied for the PRC to assume China’s seat at the United Nations. India lobbied relentlessly to seat the PRC at the United Nations, even rejecting, in protest, the offer to take China’s seat at the Security Council. Additional notable contributions of Nehru on behalf the PRC: During the negotiations of the San Francisco Treaty or Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951, formally ending World War II and allocating provisions on the status of Taiwan, Nehru fought for the PRC to be represented. He was not successful, but he nevertheless insisted on...} In Nehru’s assessment, China and
India shared similar problems and therefore, they should draw close together. As partners in a New Asia, with their combined talent, working capability, and geographical situation, they would grow strong and “there is nothing to stop them.” So, Nehru legally alleviated the area of possible contentious and potential disagreement between China and India, that of the status of Tibet. This was formalized in the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, officially recognizing Tibet as a part of China. Nehru’s well-intentioned diplomatic mediation and concessions were his way of building an enduring friendship, despite incompatibilities in their belief systems.

II. Tibet and the Himalayan Boundaries in the Center of the Storm

One Himalayan size obstacle stood in the way of Nehru’s vision of Asian internationalism and Sino-Indian solidarity after independence in 1947. It was the question of Tibet and the ambiguous boundaries separating India, China and Tibet. Straddled between two great powers, Tibet was of strategic importance for British India as a buffer zone or as an extension of power projection for China’s imperial rule. India and Tibet had cultural and religious ties through the spread of Buddhism and subsequent pilgrimages and trade exchanges across borders; while China had centuries of historical connection including the traditional status of “suzerainty” over Tibet. Both nationalists providing the PRC a forum to declare Chinese wishes for Japan to renounce its claim over Taiwan. In 1954, Nehru paved the way for China to participate in Geneva Convention in the peace settlement in Indochina. Nehru advocated for the PRC to be included in the UN discussion to come into a solution to the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. See also John Garver, Protracted Rivalry, 117-119. On India’s role as mediator in the Korean War, see K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1955), 108-110.

44 Jawaharlal Nehru, see speech during debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, September 30, 1954, India’s Foreign Policy, 305.

45 China, Nationalists or Communists, regarded Tibet as part of China. For centuries, the relationship between China and Tibet was cyclical based on the power balance in the region. When a strong Chinese dynasty was in place, Tibet sought Chinese protection. On occasion, appointments of the
and the communists, concerning Tibet, shared the belief that this land was historically part of China. However, after the revolution that toppled the Manchu Dynasty, Tibet became nominally free as the central Chinese government was too weak to exert any jurisdiction over the land-locked state.

Separating India’s and China’s Tibet were the long, inhospitable, and contested territories in the east, west and central sectors of the 2,500 miles of the Himalayan frontiers. In the eastern sector, southeast of Tibet is the frontier that intersects India’s administered North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now called Arunachal Pradesh), essentially the McMahon Line, which was the main contention in the border dispute, and Burma (Myanmar). In the western sector, the protruding triangular mount of Aksai Chin crisscrosses the west of Tibet, India’s northwestern part of Kashmir and China’s Xinjiang province (Appendix I).

The entanglement of Tibet that would bedevil the Sino-Indian relations could be traced back to the controversial Simla Conference of 1914. The British Foreign Secretary, Henry McMahon, drew a map of the eastern sector of the boundary that he hoped would be recognized by representatives from Britain, Tibet, and the Chinese government. At any time before, boundaries between India and Tibet had never been formally defined. Traditionally, Tibet was of premium strategic importance for British...

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Dalai Lama were decided with China’s assistance. The historical relationships bordered on a tributary and as a protectorate in nature. These historical antecedents provided the credence, in China’s perspective, of its claim over Tibet. See Shakya Tsering, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Goumindang and PRC were succinct in their aim to recover lost territories from foreign incursions. Regarding Tibet, General Chiang Kai-Shek lamented, “In the territory of China a hundred years ago, compromising more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not essential to the survival of the Chinese nation.” And Mao informed Edgar Snow as early as 1936, “The immediate task of China was to regain all of our lost territories... The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples for autonomous republics attached to the Chinese Federation.” Quoted from Allen Whiting, *Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Anne Harbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975), 7-9.
India as a genuine buffer state. The redrawn map (later known as the McMahon Line) essentially extended the boundaries in the northeastern sector, incorporating roughly 40,000 square miles of territories that were inhabited by ethnically of “Mongolian” extraction and pushing northeastward covering a portion of northern Burma. The McMahon Line, located in India’s Northeast, is only a portion of the 2,500 miles of the continuous boundary separating Tibet and India, but it was the most significant for British India as it defined the “best protection for the common border” between India and Tibet.\(^\text{47}\) The British and Tibetan delegates signed the accord, while the Chinese representative, in protest, refused to sign it.

Shelved for thirty-two years, the Simla accord became dormant until 1937 when the Deputy Foreign Secretary, Olaf Caroe, decided to resurrect the McMahon Line as the basis for British policy in the Himalaya. In 1943, British India faced threats from World War II including possible penetration from the Soviet Union and Japan. Concerned about a possible breach in security, the British Raj unilaterally decided to establish the McMahon Line as the official border without further consultation from the Tibetans or the Chinese. Since the imperial rule of the Manchu and subsequent governments of the Guomindang and the People’s Republic of China, Tibet had always been considered an integral part of China. In practice, the disarray in the Chinese republican government enabled British India to exercise diplomatic and extraterritorial rights inside Tibet.\(^\text{48}\) Nehru would relinquish these rights in the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, but the exact

\(^\text{47}\) Alastair Lamb, *Tibet, China & India 1914-1950: A History of Imperial Diplomacy*, (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1989), 143. The Northwestern map of Aksai Chin, barren and inhabitable, was not a concern in terms of threat as Nehru concluded, not even “a blade of grass grows” there. See *India Foreign Policy*, 349.

\(^\text{48}\) Three major trade routes and destinations inside Tibet: Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok where Indian military troops were stationed, including Indian guesthouses, post, telegraph and communication services inside Tibet.
status or alignment of the McMahon Line was never discussed nor any general reference to the Indo-Tibetan border. As such, the borders remained undefined from the Chinese perspective. But for Nehru, the Himalayan frontiers were “clear and a well-known fact” as settled.49

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in 1949, the Government of India (GOI) extended official recognition to the unified China. By August of 1950, the GOI brought to the PRC the concerns of unsettled conditions across the border, meaning the remnants of trade routes, safe houses and small Indian troops inside Tibet. Thus the GOI urged that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful talks and to stabilize the Sino-Indian border. While still in negotiation, the Chinese troops entered Tibet on October 7, 1950, out of concern that foreign intrigue or elements were to detach Tibet from China. The invasion of Tibet caused the GOI to censure the PRC’s military action in Tibet. In return, the PRC criticized India “as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet.”50 In spite of the harsh language from the Chinese, Nehru was resigned to the fact that neither Tibet, nor GOI, would have stopped the Chinese march to Tibet or that “any foreign power can prevent it” from occurring.51 As Nehru recognized that China’s Tibet would pose a problem, Nehru sought once more to reestablish relations with the Chinese. The Indian government initiated talks with the PRC in the later months of 1952.52 After the signing

49 India, Leading Events in India-China Relations, 5.
50 Ibid., 2.
51 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Policy Regarding China and Tibet,” November 18, 1950, SWJN, vol. 15 (part 2), 343. The Chinese referred to the march to Tibet as liberating Tibet; whereas the Indian referred to it as the Chinese invasion of Tibet.
52 See Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 3, 1952-1954, Letter dated August 2, 1952, 75. K.M.Pannikar, envoy to Beijing, informed Nehru on June 15, 1952 that Zhou had agreed to discuss about Tibet but presumed that India had no intention of claiming “special rights arising from the unequal treaties
of the treaty of Panchsheel in 1954, Nehru and Mao continued in efforts to mitigate the volatile issue of Tibet.

The dilemma of unsettled borders and contested territories was not unique to Mao and Nehru. Nehru’s ascendancy to the helm of the Indian nation-state was accompanied by the immediate border dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. At the heart of the territorial predicament between India and China were these questions: Who had the ultimate authority to decide each nation-state’s “territorial integrity and sovereignty” when the borders delineated “territorial integrity” were in question? Since appropriating lands of the nation-states was based on power politics, would there be even a possible mutual respect for one side or the other? How would one country settle border disputes within the framework of Asian solidarity?

Inherent in the Five Principles of Co-existence was the premise that an established consensus on border delineation between countries had already existed. But the boundaries in the Himalayas had not been officially defined between the two regional powers. Crucial to the assumption of the newly independent states was the integrity of one’s national boundary. If the physical frontiers identifying the nation’s statehood were contested, then, the validity of a nation’s ascendancy would also be put into question. Although the language of the principles appeared to be morally sound, they could not mitigate the intrinsic volatility attached to the status of the undefined frontiers.

See Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (California: Stanford University Press, 2014). Abraham argues that the fixed territorial homeland as a starting point for international recognition as well as establishing national identity defines the root of contemporary Asian interstate territorial conflicts after decolonization.
Territorial disputes were common after decolonization and big countries like China still clung to its irredentism in cases of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Taiwan. Correspondingly, India’s territorial disputes extended to its Northwest region of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Moreover, India had its version of Tibet in absorbing autonomous regions of Nagaland and Sikkim, the former through force. Hence, the first principle of territorial integrity necessitated a common and shared agreement over borders. Given the problematic and ambiguous nature of the Sino-Indian border and the status of Tibet and its contiguous regions, the treaty’s insistence on the territorial agreement as a prerequisite for peace had forced into open the differences between Nehru and Mao in new ways that it had never done before. Thus, the first principle would not guarantee what it was designed for in the first place. On the surface, the Five Principles seemed to offer the golden rule for good relations. But its application was subjective to each country’s interests and their status in relation to their accepted borders. When its invocation was used for different motivations, interpretations, and applications, the Five Principles posed serious problems. In line with this argument, the status of the Himalayan frontiers between China and India was a disaster in the making.

Since territorial integrity was instrumental to any peace in the region, the border question had to be negotiated almost immediately after the ink dried on the Panchscheel Treaty. Why would Nehru then reject or choose not to discuss the settlement of the McMahon Line? Nehru provided his rationale for deciding so. When he conceded that Tibet was part of China in the Panchsheel Treaty, neither side referred directly to the border problem. Nehru relied on the McMahon Line for India’s claims as settled;

therefore, there was no point; he thought, of bringing up the subject for discussion during the Panchsheel talks. In a speech in Parliament, Nehru revealed that he was aware of the frontier question right from the beginning in 1950. He explained his rationale for not raising the issue of the McMahon Line during negotiation with the Chinese in 1954. According to Nehru, the decision was “to make clear in every possible way that our frontier was, in our opinion, clear in our maps, clear to the world and clear to China, and clear to our own people, of course.” He continued, “Why should we go about asking China to raise this question when we felt sure about it? Why invite discussion about a thing on which we had no doubt?”

In his letter to his Chief Minister dated July 1, 1954 (three months after the signing of Panchsheel), Nehru laid out his strategic thinking in relinquishing India’s claim to Tibet and how it directly related to the McMahon Line and Panchsheel. On the few critics in his government that claimed that India gave up a fundamental right that should not have been done, Nehru stated that India had no legal claims and could not “function within Tibet as if Tibet was under our influence.” The fact, Nehru asserted, that India would not stop China from claiming Tibet “in any way, nor indeed we had any legal justification for trying to do so.” But, he argued, that there was “no giving in at all” to the Chinese. Closely related to this, according to Nehru, were the two important aspects of this agreement: “that indirectly the question of our long frontier is settled; and the principles of non-aggression and non-interference, etc. (Five Principles) are laid

55 Nehru made several references to this assertion of declaring publicly the McMahon Line as India’s recognized borders. “I have made our position clear in the border issue by statements in Parliament and later by letters, for ten years now (since 1949). There is no doubt that the Chinese Government knew about it. They remained silent.” See India’s Foreign Policy, 351. “One would think that these matters should have come up for discussion. They did not. I accepted the boundary as it was.” Ibid., 352.
57 Ibid., 585.
58 Ibid., 587.
The first of Nehru’s assertions was that the McMahon Line was India’s and the second was the fact that the Chinese had signed the treaty, which bound them to adhere to the Five Principles of respecting India’s territorial integrity and thus the McMahon Line.

In Parliament, Nehru argued publicly that India’s frontier, including the McMahon Line, was “a firm one and was not open to discussion.... so that the Chinese Government might have no doubts about our attitude. I did not think it necessary to address the Chinese Government on this question because that itself would have shown some doubt on our part.” When the Chinese did not dispute Nehru’s public declaration on Himalayan frontiers, he concluded that the Indian cartographic map inherited from the British was clear and a matter of fact. Since India recognized China’s claim over Tibet, therefore, the Chinese without contradicting India’s claim, must have acquiesced to the legality of the McMahon Line. He assumed that there must be a quid pro quo that occurred between the two nations of what they deemed as national importance to both parties.

In spite of Nehru’s bravado that the McMahon Line was an established fact, he must have felt some anxiety over the frontiers. He estimated that the Panchsheel Treaty with its Five Principles would serve as restraining order on China’s counterclaims on India’s recognized borders. In a speech to the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954, Nehru explained:

"It is not a question of believing the other party’s word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I might say so, where it finds it difficult to break its word.”

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 586.
In an unpublished circular to the Congress party leaders, Nehru revealed that he was setting a condition for China’s compliance on Panchsheel by sponsoring it to attend Bandung, “The more frequent China pledge to observe the principles, and the wider the audience, the more substantial would be the environment and the clearer the moral interdiction.” In Nehru’s point of view, linking the Chinese to commit to the Five Principles was the best assurance of the Chinese adhering to it. In Bandung, the Chinese would now be subjected to the world’s court of public opinion. Surely, he reasoned, the Chinese had all the intentions to abide by the Five Principles.

Additionally, during Nehru’s visit to Beijing on October 18, 1954, Nehru raised the question of some map published in China that showed an incorrect boundary alignment, Zhou replied that those maps were old and that the Chinese had no time to revise them. Nehru declared explicitly during that conversation that India’s recognized boundary was “clear and well-known and not a matter of argument” and Zhou concurred. That particular discussion seemed to satisfy Nehru.

Yet, the Chinese had not accepted the McMahon Line as a legal claim for India, but rather an artifact from British imperialism. Given their aversion to unequal treaties, the Chinese interpretation of unsettled boundaries was based on mutual consultation and

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62 Ibid.
63 China, in 1961, concluded border treaties with its neighboring countries: Burma, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan in 1961. For Burma, China signed a border treaty recognizing the Burma’s and China’s borders as drawn by the British, essentially the McMahon Line at the Burma/China border. For details of this delineation, see John Garver, *Protracted Rivalry*, 253-254.
renewal of the agreement between “equals” and not just a legacy from the imperial past. 65 Being a revolutionary government, the Chinese would not accept the legality of the McMahon Line without renegotiation. This fundamental disagreement undermined the first principle of “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty” in Panchsheel and thus made the entire document untenable at best and a lightening rod for conflict over borders at worst.

The principles, in essence, were designed for a particular advantage that favored the status quo. In the first and third principle of “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” and “non interference in each other’s affairs” respectively, one has to “accept the way they are” to avoid conflict. 66 In other words, it is only advantageous for those who held the upper hand and disastrous for those who happened to hold the end of the stick. In unsettled boundaries, the nation-state that had the means to diplomatically and militarily defend its claim had the lopsided advantage against the other claimant. In the process of legal acceptance of territorial boundary, two stages had to occur between sovereign states; the defined territories had to be “delimited (diplomatically agreed) and demarcated (jointly marked out on the ground).” 67 Since both China and India had an ambiguous understanding and ultimately, a contentious disagreement on boundary setting, it pushed the urgency for both to demarcate these territories. As Nehru adroitly remarked on the second principle of non-aggression, “What

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is aggression and what is not aggression depends, of course on where you draw the line of demarcation.  

Rather than a guarantee of peace and friendly relations, the Five Principles based on territoriality, ultimately, presented a perfect rationale to carry out policies to enlarge stakes and areas of control to obtain the most advantage for oneself. Since the Himalayan frontiers were unsettled, undefined, and not officially delimited (diplomatically agreed), both countries started probing territories. These probes were necessary to understand the lay of the frontiers for future negotiations. Once the routine probing of unmarked territories was perceived as an incursion by one side, the other would accelerate the same action to safeguard its interests. Lacking mutually agreeable interpretation of their positions, the race for China and India to probe, delineate and then to demarcate territories (unilateral marking of posts) became a necessity to maximize their claims in the Himalayas. Herein lies a basic contradiction of Panchsheel. If the benchmark of peaceful co-existence was centered on “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,” therefore, the primacy of physical territories as fixed, marked and claimed trumped all considerations. It became a zero-sum game of who could exert the most gain in unilateral demarcation.

Indeed, China and India raced to probe and demarcate territories and maximize their positions in the Himalayas. Both countries started probing territories as early as 1954.  

On July 17, 1954, three months after the signing of the treaty, the PRC protested against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti (which the Chinese called Wuje) in the Uttar Pradesh. It was followed by a protest on June 28, 1955 from the GOI to the PRC of

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68 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, 350.
69 See *Leading Events*, 4.
an authorized crossing of a Chinese party in Barahoti. These territorial probes, mostly on the Chinese side according to the Indian record, caused protests, but they did not immediately result in a major clash between Nehru and Mao. However, the territorial probing, patrolling and building outposts intensified year after year. These actions became a necessity to lay and stake claims. Owing to the ambiguous nature of non-delineated boundaries, the likelihood of accidental encroachment into each other’s claimed territories raised the stakes for a confrontation. Claims and counterclaims of trespassing became prevalent and more hostile.

On September 1956, the first threat of arms was reported by the Indian government against a Chinese patrol who trespassed into the Indian-claimed territory in Shipki Pass. By 1958, “arrests and detentions” and “ill treatments” were being reported by the Indian government against the Chinese in the Western sector of the Aksai Chin. Additionally, the GOI reported the “construction of permanent or semi-permanent structures” in Uttar Pradesh. In 1958, India discovered a dirt road constructed by the PRC across Ladakh, the northwest disputed border, which was considered by the Indian as part of their territory. The Indian public upon the road’s discovery was vehemently outraged. Within two months in late 1958, there were three incidents reported by the GOI of aircraft intrusion flying over Tibet on India’s airspace.

From 1955 to 1958, India lodged formal complaints including protests to the Chinese government of more than twenty incidents where the Chinese, according to the

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70 Ibid., 7.
71 Ironically, these reports of aircraft flying over Indian airspace were later identified as those operated by Taiwan with tacit approval from India’s Intelligence Bureau. See John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival* (New York: Public Affairs 1999), 248.
Indian record, crossed her boundary. Then, in early January 1959, Premier Zhou officially “repudiated the traditional, delimited boundary” that India recognized as its official borders. The Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and the McMahon Line, according to Zhou, had never been recognized by the PRC. Therefore, from the Chinese point of view, renegotiation was in order from a clean slate to settle the contested boundaries. Subsequently, the claims and counterclaims reached a climax in 1959 when Indian and Chinese forces clashed at the bridge of Longju in the eastern sector. It was no accident that this confrontation occurred just four months after the Dalai Lama’s escape to India.

III. The Implications of Panchsheel

The Panchsheel Treaty was a remarkable turn of events that led to 1959, the year of no return for Sino-Indian relations. From the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty in 1954 to the seminal moments of their solidarity in Bandung in 1955 (next chapter), Nehru continued to speak of one Asia, but his speeches did not have the ring of the vitality of the past. It became evident that its relevance for Nehru was faltering in the face of political polarization in the form of collective defense pacts dividing Asians. He would speak of China’s friendship less and less, owing to the simmering tensions in Tibet and

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72 Details of border incidents from 1956 to the tail of 1958. See Leading Events, 4-6.
73 See Leading Events, 8.
74 Initiated by the United States, collective defense started in the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and was followed onwards by military blocs and organizational groupings “to stem the tide of communism in Asia in this war.” Of these alliances, the most important were the tripartite treaty between the United States Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) of 1951, the South-East Asia Defense Pact (SEATO) in 1954, comprised of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. The Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 comprised of Turkey and Iraq later joined by Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. See, Philippe Braillard and Mohammad Reza Djalili, The Third World and International Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), 13.
the Himalayan frontier. Later that year, there were emerging disagreements in the official cartography of the boundaries. But nothing could withstand the jolts to the relations after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India on March 31, 1959.

By 1959, Nehru began to doubt the veracity of their relations. The severity of the impact of the Dalai Lama’s escape to India brought to the surface the pent-up Chinese insecurities. The Chinese accused India of masterminding the kidnapping of the Dalai Lama. Nehru decried the use of vituperative language that was reproachful and unbecoming to behaviors of friendly relations, an affront to India’s sense of national pride. From Nehru’s point of view, labeling “unfounded charges gravely impaired” the first principle of “mutual respect.” The crisis took a political turn as it played out in the public domain through newsprints and exchange of notes between governments as they were echoed in the debating chambers of the Indian Parliament and the Chinese halls of Congress. They were often heated and uncompromising. Predictably, the reverberations were also manifested along the frontiers where both forces would meet face to face.

In 1954, Nehru spoke of China as the partner for peace and against Western imperialism; by 1959, Nehru was calling into question Sino-Indian relations. As he grappled with questions during Parliamentary debates about the implications of the deteriorating situations over contested borders and the Tibetan crisis, he wondered if they understood each other at all: “I just do not know how the Chinese mind works, I have been surprised at the recent developments.” Or the Chinese actions were “local

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75 Jawaharlal Nehru, Happening in Tibet, statement in Lok Sabha, April 27, 1959, India’s Foreign Policy, 323.  
76 Jawaharlal Nehru, reply to debate in Rajya Sabha, September 10, 1959, on India’s borders with China, India’s Foreign Policy, 352.
aggressiveness or a desire to show us our place." The Chinese accusations were uncomprehending for Nehru; as an arbiter for the PRC before, he wondered, "if the Government of India and Government of China speak quite the same language, and if, using the same words or similar words, we mean the same thing." In the same vein, Nehru pondered that there was "a lack of understanding or recognition in China of the revolution in India....They forget that India is not a country which can not be ignored even though she may speak in a gentler language." In questioning the Chinese reasoning, he concluded, "In the final analysis, the Chinese have valued India’s friendship only to a very small extent." In Nehru’s candid letters to his Chief Ministers, he speculated that the Chinese were reverting to the old "Middle Kingdom" mentality to be treated in patronizing ways because of its "superiority." More purposely, Nehru surmised the trouble of having a "strong and united Chinese state, expansive and pushing out in various directions and full of pride in its growing strength."

As the border clashes intensified, both leaders invoked the violation of the Five Principles. In the span of four years, it was extraordinary how the reversal of Nehru’s understanding of China changed. As such, rather than strengthening their relations as the principles intended to accomplish, the document locked them into conflict by insisting that territorial integrity was the only means for peace. This language forced Mao and

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77 Ibid., 344.
78 Ibid., 347.
79 Ibid.,
80 Ibid., 352.
82 Ibid., letter dated October 1, 1959, 286.
83 Zhou’s letter reported by Nehru at the Lok Sabha, September 12, 1959, where Zhou accused Nehru of not abiding to the Five Principles of Nehru’s upholding of the McMahon Line. “Does this accord with the Five Principles advocated by Mr. Nehru?” See India’s Foreign Policy, 353.
Nehru to confront each other more forcefully as they elevated their quarrels on moral
grounds based on Panchsheel. Instead of being an instrument to foster friendly
understanding, the invocation of the Five Principles to justify each other’s action
hastened the deterioration of their relations. In other words, bilateral relations and
peaceful co-existence were based on the agreement over what territorial integrity meant.
Thus, the decision to elevate territorial claims as the primary determinant of Sino-Indian
relations led to the impossibility of peace and friendship.

In one of the heated debates in the Indian Parliament on the Tibetan crisis, Nehru
explained that the Himalayan impasse was more than a quarrel about territory but “where
national prestige is involved, it is not the two miles of territory that matter, but the
nation’s dignity and self-respect.”84 At the end of 1959, Nehru again reiterated his
feelings about the Himalayan frontier, “Where a nation’s honor and self-respect are
concerned, one cannot proceed on the basis of barter, haggling and that tactics of the
marketplace.”85 This open hostility toward China was a product of opposition over the
meaning and the basis of their peace treaty, one that intensified rather than mitigated
conflict between India and China.

IV. Conclusion

The aim of Panchsheel was to ground China and India to follow a set of
principled guidelines for interstate relations. Inaugurated during the signing of the
Panchsheel Treaty of 1954, when China’s sovereignty over Tibet was officially

84 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Approach to the Tibetan Issue, September 4, 1959, India’s Foreign
Policy, 344.
85 Jawaharlal Nehru, Nehru’s reply to discussion in Lok Sabha, December 1959, India’s Foreign
Policy, 381.
acknowledged; nonetheless, China and India missed the opportunity to address the
Himalayan contiguous frontiers. As the boundaries had not been delineated before, there
was no need to pin on the borders as definitive rules of friendly relations between them.
That would have to wait after the delineation of borders happened first. But since both
were anxious to cement their friendship, the Five Principles became the unrealistic
panacea for mitigating the contested frontiers.

Owing to the moral implications accompanying Panchsheel, both China and India
were hamstrung by its finality as the only barometer of their friendship. Predictably, the
consequences of unsettled borders and disputed territorial sovereignty became one of the
factors that unraveled the friendship between them. This demonstrates the inherent
contradictions and shortcomings in Panchsheel. Despite that it promoted the adherence to
the Five Principles of Co-existence, intrinsic to it was the recognition of mutually agreed
boundary delineation. The treaty forced the debate over these borders to the forefront of
Sino-Indian relations. Both China and India wanted to develop friendship until they
quarreled over the meaning of territorial integrity and sovereignty that was instrumental
to Panchsheel.

When Nehru insisted that “without the shadow of a doubt in my mind that the
McMahon Line is right, map or no map, and we will not allow anybody to come across
that boundary,” he violated the fourth principle of “equality and cooperation for mutual
benefit.” By walking away from dialogue, equitable concession and negotiated
settlement, crucial ingredients to friendly relations, Nehru invalidated Chinese concerns

86 “McMahon Line is right.” See discussion in Lok Sabha, December 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru,
India’s Foreign Policy, 381. “Map or no Map” see Nehru’s replied to H.V. Kamath’s inquiry in Parliament
on November 20, 1950. “Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary, and that is our boundary
— map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary and we will not allow anybody to
and intentions. In the end, Nehru caved into the dictates of national mandates and decidedly cast aside the Asian cooperation of which he was the most ardent advocate.
Chapter Three

The 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung

"There is no alternative for any country, unless it wants war but to accept the concept of peaceful co-existence."

-Jawaharlal Nehru

When it comes to Asian internationalism, the Bandung Conference soars above the rest of Nehru's initiatives in the global arena. The first Asian-African Conference commemorated an unprecedented moment of Asian diplomacy. Yet, in reality Bandung was a stage whereby diverse agendas and contradictory goals were on display. Rather than a highpoint for Asian unity, Bandung would be the turning point for Nehru to realize that his ideas about Asian solidarity were untenable. Far from the early years when Nehru met Asian revolutionaries and activists seeking to challenge imperialism, the Bandung Conference brought together Asian heads of nation-states to pursue their national agenda. In the Bandung conference, the importance of state imperatives trumped any sense of international or regional unity among the delegates. The event underscored for Nehru the primacy of the nation-state over internationalism and the spirit of Asian cooperation.

Triumphalist narratives dominate the history of Bandung for the African and Asian countries. The American exiled activist Richard Wright seemed to echo what everyone in the formerly colonized world longed to remember. The disenfranchised and the oppressed met in Bandung to render a clear "judgment upon the Western world." 87

87 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, 12.
The event’s achievement is summed up in the words of Indonesian President Sukarno, in his opening speech, as “the first international conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind.”

On the surface, Zhou and Nehru exemplified the essence of “Hindi Chini bhai bhai” (Chinese and Hindus are brothers) in Bandung, a harmonious dance between two leaders of large Asian states who promoted Peaceful Co-Existence. But, under the surface, the Bandung Conference went a long way in deepening mistrust between Nehru and his Asian colleagues in a way that made the event, like Panchsheel, a critical turning point away from Nehru’s cherished vision of Asian solidarity and cooperation.

Early writings on Bandung focused on international relation accounts that offer balanced analyses regarding procedural and political insights. Drawing from personal narratives are those books written by eyewitnesses to the event either as journalists or diplomats. Foremost of these books are those penned by former delegates to Bandung: Kotelawala, Romulo, and Sukarno. These recollections and memories from different voices, vivid accounts, and inside information provide a certain texture and color that brought to life the “Babel-like nature” of Bandung. Still, contemporary scholars on Bandung have examined the conference from other perspectives with a focus on human rights and racism. One particular study exposed the inherent racism and outright

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hostilities of the Western press against the Chinese Premier, making his triumph in Bandung even more fabled.  

92 Most historians define Bandung as Nehru’s greatest achievement in foreign policy and the most visible and “dramatic demonstration” of Nehru’s Asian internationalism.  

93 It also has been billed as the “climax of Nehru’s Asianism.”  

94 As a leader and statesman, Nehru’s enduring legacy and achievement were intimately linked to the “year of Bandung.”  

95 Nation-state imperatives against Nehru’s idea of Asian cooperation were glaring in Bandung. In contrast to the interwar years where cooperation among activists across borders allowed fluidity in movements against imperialists, Nehru and other Asian leaders were now confronted with a global landscape dominated by Cold War divisions. It would seem that the rapid deterioration in the world situation could have prompted the Asian delegates to join in solidarity; rather, the polarized world tended to separate the developing nations with their diverging political viewpoint. In Bandung, Nehru would experience this first hand.

The original impetus for the Bandung Conference emerged with the five Colombo Powers: India’s Nehru, Indonesia’s Sukarno, Burma’s U Nu, Ceylon’s Kotelawala (neutrals), and Pakistan’s Ali (Western-allied). They met in 1954 to discuss the growing frustration and alienation from Western intrusions in Asia. They raised two specific issues. The first was the Sino-American tensions in Southeast Asia and their desire to

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95 Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004), 216.
develop China's peaceful orientation and contact among the Asian and African nations.\(^{96}\) The second was the determination to place in their hands a more active role in Asian affairs and to solve Asian problems.\(^ {97}\) From the onset, the Colombo leaders aimed for Asian cooperation as the means to solve problems of common interest and concern, wrote the Prime Minister Kotewala of Ceylon. Its goal was to declare to the West that the only viable peace initiative in the region was through "the one formulated by or approved by the leaders of Free Asian countries."\(^ {98}\)

However, among the Colombo Powers themselves, there were differing agendas that motivated them: For India, Bandung was a forum to promote Panchsheel as an alternative to military blocs of the Cold War. Kotelawala of Ceylon was concerned about the big Indian population inside of his country and the threat of subverting its sovereignty. An anti-communist, he would rattle the committee by raising the controversial issue of defining communism as the new form of colonialism in Bandung. Sympathizing with the PRC, Burma, India, and Indonesia wanted to encourage China's independence from the Soviet Union and end her isolation. Indonesia hoped to gather support for its claims over West Irian (West Papua) against the Dutch. Pakistan, a staunch US ally, was prepped up to counter any communist gain in the conference; was ready to voice out her security concern over India, the fate of the Palestine state, and generally of the Arab world.\(^ {99}\) It was not hard to conclude that the disparate national

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\(^{96}\) After the end of the Korean War and the settlement of the Indo-China crisis in 1954, a new crisis arose in the Taiwan Strait. As the US encirclement continued and China's concerns of the US pushing for "Two Chinas", the PRC launched offensive shelling of Matsu and Jinmen islands, increasing tensions in the region.


imperatives accompanying the founders of the Bandung Conference would ultimately lead to further division in Bandung.\textsuperscript{100}

This chapter contends with older interpretations of Bandung by arguing that the politics at play in the Asian-African conference countered Nehru's Asianism and promoted division rather than unity. This argument agrees in many ways with those laid out by Itty Abraham, although his focus is on race as a determining factor in Nehru's conceptualization of Asian internationalism.\textsuperscript{101} Instead, a reading of Bandung demonstrates that Asian national leaders of newly created states were inclined to act on state imperatives, usually along Cold War lines, rather than a sense of collective internationalism or regionalism. The varied agenda, old and new grievances, perceived threats real or imagined, rivalries and alliances nearly undermined any meaningful conclusion to the Asian meeting.

\textsuperscript{100} The Soviets' Central Asian states were not invited. The state of Israel was excluded not to offend the Arab states, who made it clear that they would boycott attending if an invitation to Israel was extended. Australia and New Zealand were eliminated in the list due to their strong affiliation with the US and its Western European allies. South Korea and Taiwan were equally disqualified because of their firm association with the US. While Turkey, Iran, the Philippines and Thailand, the first was a member of NATO and the latter two were signees of SEATO, were included. The US discouraged these countries from attending but rescinded due to the fallout of international public relations and as a counter measure to blunt the anti-Western bashing in Bandung. Indonesia wanted to focus on the question of West Irian (Western Papua) while Middle Eastern countries were concerned with Palestine and colonialism. There was an undercurrent rivalry and unexpected clash between Pakistan and India. The final declaration did not reflect the peaceful co-existence language, but instead it was replaced by "live together in peace" as some delegates were opposed to its inclusion. The Five Principles of Co-existence became ten, which included the much controversial provision of the "right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively" at the insistence of Pakistan. Therefore, legitimizing the collective defense that Nehru so opposed. But constraints were put in place so that particular provisions would not be used "to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." See Jansen, \textit{Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment}. Also see Kahin, \textit{The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955}, 2-4.

\textsuperscript{101} Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947 – 65, " \textit{Commonwealth & Comparative Politics}, Vol. 46, No. 2 (April 2008). According to Abraham, the contingent political factors, not moral superiority, were the dominant factors in the formulation of nonalignment. Ultimately, it won over against Nehru's preference of racial consideration in Bandung.
Bandung of 1955 was the turning point of the demise of Nehru's idea of one Asia for what ultimately would become nonalignment, which was entirely distinct from Nehru's Asian internationalism. Formed primarily as a national and political contingency, the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) was Nehru's answer to India's determination to stay out of the Great Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and to assert India's independence to chart peaceful and friendly relations among interstates regardless of affiliations. As opposed to military might, it addresses a "moral force or as an instrument of world peace." Rooted in the interwar years, and as a guiding principle from pre-independence until 1955, the Asian solidarity was Nehru's worldview in regional empowerment. It symbolizes Nehru's quest in uniting all Asians to embody a new Asia through the elimination of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism with China as a major partner.

This chapter highlights the two most significant tensions in the political committee debates in Bandung. In doing so, it analyzes Nehru's thinking as he tried to unknot the political entanglement that dominated Bandung. The first was the wrangling over the new definition of colonialism, and the second was the debate for and against a collective defense system for Asia. The results of these debates would propel Nehru to

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104 Initiated by the United States, collective defense system started in 1949 in Europe in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Onwards, it followed in the organization of military blocs, pacts, and groupings, essentially to stem the tide of communism in Asia in this war. The tripartite treaty of ANZUS in 1951 consisted of the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) was of importance; and followed by the South-East Asia Defense Pact (SEATO) in 1954, comprised of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. The Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 comprised of Turkey and Iraq later joined
rethink his Asian orientation in light of what seemed irreparable disparities among them and to reexamine his relations with the Chinese.

I. Defining a New Form of Colonialism

As an opening salvo during the deliberation on problems with dependent peoples, Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon spoke about a collective resolution against colonialism. Kotelawala, one of the Colombo Five, argued that “There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds....” Referring to the recent situations in the satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe, he asked, “Should it not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?”

Predictably, pro-Western countries lined up to support Ceylon. The representative of Turkey (NATO member) proposed a resolution for the condemnation of “eleven types of colonialism,” while the Lebanese delegate expanded the definition as “Colonialism, Old, and New,” emphasizing that condemnation of colonialism should not only be assigned to the old form but also on the new form taking shape in Eastern Europe.  

The suggestion that the Soviet Union was an imperialist power engendered an intense debate that pitted Asian state leaders against one another along the fault-lines of the Cold War. At the heart of this debate was the overwhelming security perception posed by the two opposing systems: capitalism and communism. For the pro-Western aligned nation-states, the threat was communism, and they sought to condemn it as a new form of colonialism. For the Eastern-aligned coalition such as China and North Vietnam,
it was the aggression of US imperialism that brought them to Bandung to seek solidarity among Asians. The Chinese Premier, being allied to the Soviet, countered Ceylon’s characterization of new colonialism and appealed to seek “common ground while reserving differences.”

Nehru worried that the proceedings would be mired in endless debate, and he appealed for harmony. He pleaded, “I am not an admirer of the Soviets. I dislike many of the things they have done, as I dislike many of the things the Western Powers have done.” Nevertheless, he defended the Soviet Union and argued against its classification as an imperialist.

It was the interconnection of capitalism and imperialism of the Western mold that predisposed Nehru to be critical of Western imperialism. For him, the Soviet Union and its October Revolution was a seminal achievement and as an inspiration in the liberation of the subject peoples. It was precisely this early experience that provided him with the lasting impression that “Soviet Russia and India were ideal partners against imperialism.” In Nehru’s estimation, the inherent capitalist exploitation by Western enterprises such as the British East India company and the Dutch East India company had perpetuated imperial expansion and tight control over their dominion. The wealth of Western empires and the subjugation of the colonized peoples were intimately linked in Nehru’s belief. In the words of Krishna Menon, Nehru’s chief political adviser, the

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108 On the interconnection of capitalists and imperialists, see Michele Louro, *A Special ‘Blend’ of Nationalism and Internationalism*, 41.
109 On Nehru’s admiration for the Soviet Union during interwar years, Ibid, 42-44.
disposition of Indian foreign policy was that the “West meant Empire.”

Even in the age of decolonization, Western imperialism continued to reclaim its domination. It was the reason the French, after the Second World War, desperately fought to retain Indo-China’s status as a colony and its repressive control over Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For the Dutch, it was crucial to reassert their neocolonial design over Indonesia, or for the Portuguese to preserve their enclave in Goa. In this line of thinking, Nehru had always been critical of the West but he tended to overlook the Soviet Union’s transgressions in the European satellite states. Therefore, what was occurring in Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe was not at all comparable to Western imperialism.

The failure to reach a consensus on the question of anti-colonialism struck at the very core of Nehru’s concept of Asian solidarity. The mere fact that the delegates’ disagreement on the definition of anti-imperialism was heavily contentious demonstrated that it was no longer a cause upon which Asians could agree. Nehru wholly viewed anti-imperialism as the fundamental basis of Asian solidarity. It was their shared history of colonialism as a catalyst for activism which unified Asia in the past and present. This divide among Third World countries was a fissure that would dominate Bandung and the unity of the Colombo Five. Each camp had a rigid perception of security threats to their national interests. Either the threat was from the spread of communism or from the neocolonialism reasserting itself. The discourse on a new form of colonialism in Bandung signaled a serious weakness in Nehru’s Asian internationalism. It was evident that


111 Among the Colombo Five, Pakistan and Ceylon were anti-communist while India, Burma, and Indonesia were sympathetic to the socialist camp.
Nehru's Asianist orientation that brought about global mobilization against empires was no longer a unifying cause in the polarized world of the Cold War.

III. Peaceful Co-Existence Versus Collective Defense System

Perhaps, the most enduring legacy of Bandung for Nehru was in the political committee undertaking the promotion of world peace and co-existence in Asia. It was in this seminal moment when Nehru put forth the seeds of his foreign policy doctrine of what was to become nonalignment. The Western-allied countries such as Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Philippines collectively argued for the relevance of military alignment in the light of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. In particular, Iraq (member of the Baghdad Pact) attacked the peaceful co-existence as too nebulous to secure a reliable deterrence against the Soviet aggression. Turkey (member of NATO) justified collective defense system as a self-defense for its national security. Belonging to a Western military bloc was a reassurance and served as the deterrence to possible Soviet intrusion. Meanwhile, for weaker states in Southeast Asia with a large Chinese diaspora, Chinese communism represented the biggest threat to their independence. The Philippines made a case for smaller countries that needed external protection, and it vehemently contradicted any suggestion that military protection was other than it was, a protection from communist aggression. Therefore, Pakistan (member of CENTO and SEATO), India's nemesis, detailed the necessity to include the principle of “self-defense” as an inherent right of nations added to the declaration of principles in Bandung.

Nehru saw American interventions in Asia as problematic, and he adamantly opposed the Western-aligned position. According to Nehru, the tendency of the West,
especially the United States, to prescribe policies to the affairs of Asians without consultation was insupportable. Nehru was vocal in this regard. Writing candidly to his Chief Ministers, he complained that the "habit of the West to carry the 'white man's burden' in the East still continues even though conditions in the world and Asia have changed greatly." 112 What was inadmissible for the neutrals was the fact that only three out of eight members were considered Asians in the newly formed South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 113 SEATO was a treaty that was formed as a scheme to have US military presence felt in Asia, an encirclement designed to isolate China and the Soviet. Nehru showed his contempt for it as a sham, "The South East Asian Conference thus is really and principally a European and American Conference without much of Asia in it. And yet, the problems they deal with will be Asian." 114 He berated military pacts: "Some countries are not only anxious to protect themselves against possible aggression, but also lay claim to protect other countries, even though the others do not ask for such protection." 115

That the Asian leaders in Bandung had dismissed Panchscheel, a regionally derived doctrine, and instead supported military pacts with the West proved to be another breaking point in Nehru's Asian internationalism. At the climactic political committee debate, the Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu of Turkey defended the general principle that "there was no safety for any state except through pacts of collective security," which

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113 Formed in September 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) members: The United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.
115 Ibid.
Nehru repudiated emphatically. Given Nehru's aversion to military alliances, he, with all his logic, could not fathom the denigration of losing one's freedom of self-determination to a superpower whether to the Soviets or the United States. In his mind, no country should be prepared to give up its inherent right to independent judgment. The idea of surrendering one's independence was abhorrent to Nehru, "It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way." He had healthy suspicions that the superpowers were self-serving in forming these pacts not merely for the collective security but to extending their spheres of influence in Asia. Installing military bases could not guarantee stability in the region. The reverse was true according to Nehru. The militarization of the region only increased fear, insecurity and tensions.

In answering the Turk, Nehru affirmed his conviction that any nation-state joining the United States or the Soviet Union was dividing the world and acting in direct violation of Panchsheel. In spite of the compulsions of the small states to seek security from the big powers, there would be no guaranteed security. Recognizing the lopsided partnership based on the power politics of collective defense, Nehru succinctly explained this inherent inequality, "There is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one had to obey the other and when one dominates the other." If security was imperative,

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116 See Jansen, "High Noon at Bandung, "Afro-Asian and Non-Alignment, 209. Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan were US aligned.
118 On SEATO, see Jawaharlal Nehru, speech during a debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, September 29, 1954, India's Foreign Policy, 87 – 93.
it was through peaceful co-existence that would be the best guarantee. Coming to
Bandung, Nehru’s game plan was to take back the Asian agenda into the hands of Asians
and to implore the new independent states to stand by peaceful co-existence rather than
join either the competing blocs. Military pacts or any collective defense systems, in his
mind, were designed to subvert Asians into the ideological war between the US and the
Soviet Union. The struggle between them had little to do with economic development
and domestic concerns vital to the newly formed states.

Urging his colleagues in Bandung to subscribe to a common and shared policy for
the region, Nehru deployed the language of peaceful coexistence. As armament had
become overtly dangerous with the power of the super bombs to annihilate, Nehru urged
his audience to make a difference and to take the right action. “Are we going to throw
our weight on the scales on the side of peace or war?” 120 Nehru declared, “There is no
alternative for any country unless it wants war but to accept the concept of peaceful co-
existence.” 121 Only in peaceful co-existence and independence from the bipolarity of
ideological camps would there be viable solution to world peace:

“If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would
be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes
place in reducing that unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war.” 122

The unaligned area Nehru spoke about was the balancing buffer, a shield between two
contesting poles as he sought to enlarge the neutral ground as an area of peace.

120 Jawaharlal Nehru, speech by Prime Minister Nehru before the Political Committee of the
1955, 66.
121 Ibid., 67.
122 Ibid., 66. Also see Itty Abraham, “From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign
this angle, Nehru, the undisputed leader of the neutral states, saw a clear utility and purpose of India’s “independence in external affairs” in expanding the unaligned area.\textsuperscript{123} As the vast majority of Asian and African countries had won their freedom, an intensive competition, according to Nehru, between “the rival blocs for the soul of these newly independent countries” was at stake.\textsuperscript{124} The more nation-states he could convince to align themselves to the neutral column, the larger the area he could claim for peace and stability in the region. The unaligned area of neutrality was crucial to the balance of power between the warring camps. In this vein, Nehru was forming a viable alternative for those developing countries whose wishes were not to be dominated by any of the big powers.

Nehru made clear that “If I join any of these big groups, I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no views left...I belonged to neither, and I propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world.”\textsuperscript{125} In this speech, Nehru essentially declared his doctrine: one was either for Panchsheel or alignment. By situating his position irrevocably on the side of Panchsheel, Nehru had cast the fate of the Sino-Indian relations unintentionally. Nehru, perhaps unaware at that time, would make a clean break away from his long-held conception that China was India’s “sister in the East.”\textsuperscript{126} In the ensuing years to come, indeed, he would speak less and less of Asian solidarity and China as a partner and more of peaceful co-existence.

\textsuperscript{123} Krishna Menon defined the soon to be nonalignment as, “It is merely independence in external affairs.” Quoted from Michael Brecher, \textit{India and world Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World} (New York: Praeger, 1968), 3-4.
\textsuperscript{124} Jawaharlal Nehru, \textit{India’s Foreign Policy}, 84.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} On a number of occasions Nehru referred to China as India’s ‘great sister in the East.’ \textit{Glimpses of World History}, 270. Also see China as a sister nation as quoted, “Let us go to India’s sister in ancient history – China.” Ibid.,28.
For Nehru, an Asian entity could be straddling either position: neutrality or alignment to either camp as Bandung clearly demonstrated in its proceedings and deliberations. But a nation-state that truly professed neutrality, without affiliation to any of the two big powers, regardless whether it was Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Latin American or European, must adhere to the principle of peaceful coexistence. Asianism was regional in scope whereas adherents to Panchsheel belonged to a bigger tent of an international community seeking peace. It was not enough for a country to adhere to Panchsheel, as China did during the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, but also for that country not to affiliate itself to either the socialist or the capitalist camp. Advocating for peaceful co-existence and belonging in the sphere of a military bloc were politically non-congruous, as he would later find out as the Chinese taught him in 1962 when they went to war. Looking back at the formation of nonalignment from one of Nehru’s close foreign policy advisers, Menon recalled the rationale behind it, “non-aligned nation must be non-aligned with the non-aligned” to form a rational and cohesive coalition for peace. After Bandung, Nehru must have realized that a partnership with China was illogical. He must have come to the conclusion that a Soviet-aligned country, like China, could not be an honest broker or partner for peace.

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127 Krishna Menon reflecting on the formation of nonalignment to be effective and truly independent, “non-aligned nation must be non-aligned with the non-aligned.” See India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, 13.

128 Divergent of directional paths between Nehru and Mao as Mao pursued a more radical revolutionary prescription in domestic and international spheres. Initiated in 1957 during his declaration that the “East Wind was prevailing over the West Wind,” which essentially charted that the “forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.” See Mao Zedong, Speech at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers parties (November 18, 1957), Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 80-81. Also see John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 121-124.
III. Conclusion

Bandung was a watershed for Nehru. The fact that he declined to support a proposal for a second Bandung by Indonesia's Sukarno as early as in 1956, and subsequently by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to convene it, speaks volume of how his perceptions of Asian cohesion had changed over time. In truth, Nehru would employ his diplomatic skills to suppress any possible staging of another Bandung. He caustically remarked while reporting to the Parliament that the conference in Bandung at least "wisely avoided any provision for setting up an additional machinery of international cooperation." This statement reveals just how distinct Nehru’s outlook had become on the prospects of organizing another international body for Asian advancement. Nehru’s conclusion was hardly unexpected given the depth of dissimilarities among Asians; he must have fathomed that the Asian unity he was seeking was simply untenable. Being part of the same geographical spaces would not necessarily translate into common objectives.

129 "Nehru feels that the current conditions are not yet ripe." The Chinese Ambassador of Syria and the Syrian Foreign Minister discuss the timing of the Second Asian-African Conference. February 11, 1957. "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Syria, 'The Situation of Ambassador Chen's Visit to the Syrian Foreign Minister'," History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 107-00250-06, 51-52. Translated by Jeffrey Wang. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114822 (accessed October 6, 2015). “India was not enthusiastic over the prospect of a Second Bandung Conference, because the Chinese Communists were pressing for such a conference.” The memo continued, “The prime minister [Nehru] compared this situation to the first Bandung at that time the Arab states had wished to utilize it in their dispute with Israel. He added he made himself unpopular at the time of the first conference with his insistence that local issues be left aside.” See Memorandum of Conversation dated August 24, 1962 — Jawaharlal Nehru, Howard Jones, Ambassador to Indonesia and B.E.L. Timmons, Minister Counselor, American Embassy, New Delhi. See National Security Files, Box 107, October 25, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.


131 Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted from Jansen, Afro-Asian and Non-Alignment, 221.
In Bandung, the Asian incongruities were pronounced in the number of clashes between the pro-Western group, who were militarily allied with the US, and the non-allied nation-states which were pushing for peaceful co-existence. Given the diversity of political, economic, conflicting national interests and social systems in Bandung, it became obvious to Nehru that his dream of one Asia would never come to fruition. The Third World countries brought with them their national imperatives and Cold War allegiances. Either it was for security for small countries such as the Philippines and Thailand seeking protection from a military bloc, or it was a big country like China seeking temporary alignment in peaceful co-existence to puncture the US containment and its isolation. Understandably, it became the flashpoint for Nehru to abandon his Asian internationalism and the beginning of his detachment from China as a partner. In the Belgrade Conference in 1961, Nehru promulgated the Non-Aligned Movement, a handicraft of his national imperatives rather than his customary propensity for Asian unity.
CONCLUSION

"Words like Bandung and Panchsheel have begun to lose their shine and to be hurled about without meaning..."\textsuperscript{132}

- Jawaharlal Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru’s fascination with Asian concerns, identity and solidarity was integral to his nationalist identity. Formed many years before he assumed the role of the first prime minister of newly independent India, its main characteristic was a global outlook nurtured by the Indian liberation movement against Western imperialism and colonialism. Nehru’s scope of national liberation struggle widened into an Asian-driven priority, as it became the axis round that his Indian foreign policy turned. Notable in its center was China. At the spokes were the East and Southeast Asian, and ultimately the African nation states, whose unity Nehru sought and strived to influence. Attached to this idea was the Asian reawakening with China as the partner for its peaceful rise.

In the resurgence of Asia, two celebrated moments stand out at the intersection of Asian solidarity and China’s friendship with Nehru, Panchsheel and the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence became the basis of China’s and India’s interstate relations. Bandung, the first gathering of its kind, enabled the Third World to define their national aspirations and to chart their independent course of actions. Acclaimed as hallmarks of Asian solidarity, the mandates of national interests severely tested both Panchsheel and Bandung. In the postcolonial era, the perceived threat of Great Power rivalry placed extreme stresses on the vulnerable newly independent states. The outcome of which was

\textsuperscript{132} Jawaharlal Nehru, from reply to debate on Tibet in Rajya Sabha, May 4, 1959, see India’s Foreign Policy, 326.
the triumph of national imperatives over the spirit of internationalism that preoccupied Nehru for so long.

In Panchsheel, the inherent ambiguities of boundary inheritance in the Himalayas and competing sovereignty claims over territorial frontiers overwhelmed China’s and India’s desire to build relations based on mutual trust for the benefit of peace. Both sought cooperation until their national agendas infringed on their friendship. The treaty itself bound and handicapped both China and India to an imposed restriction on territories both of them could not agree. Consequently, the premise of Panchsheel was critically undermined. As territoriality and territorial possession evolved as the recognized criterion of legitimacy in statehood; thus, nationalist impulses prevailed in the conduct of state affairs dealing with the unsettled Himalayan territories and boundaries. The Five Principles could be subverted and used as a political weapon to justify moral positions to advance their individual national cause. By walking away from negotiated settlement, Nehru relinquished his long cherished sentiment of Asian unity.

In convening Bandung, Nehru sought Asian solidarity. However, the essential catalyst for such cooperation was missing. Asia was as diverse as its geography was vast, widely varied in races, culture and beliefs, and profoundly divided along the fault-lines of the Cold War. National concerns, problems, and ambitions preoccupied each Asian nation-state. Once again the imperatives of national priorities, security and geopolitics undermined the Asian cooperation called for in the spirit of Bandung. Ultimately, it would be the turning point for Nehru to realize that his Asian sentiment was a myth. In the end, Bandung signaled a complete break for Nehru, leaving behind his idea of one Asia and with it his preoccupation for a lasting friendship with China.
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